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Abstract This paper contributes to the literature by documenting labor income
share uctuations in emerging economies and proposing an explanation for them.
We show that emerging markets dier from developed markets in terms of changes in
the labor share over the business cycle. Labor share is more volatile in emerging mar-
kets and is pro-cyclical with output, especially in countries facing counter-cyclical
interest rates. On the contrary, labor share in developed markets is more stable
and slightly counter-cyclical with output. A frictionless RBC model cannot account
for these facts. We introduce working capital into an RBC model, which generates
liquidity need for labor payments. The main result is that the behavior of the cost
of borrowing along with working capital mechanisms can predict the right sign of
the comovement between labor share and output, and can partly be responsible for
the volatility of labor share. We also show that imperfect nancial markets in the
form of credit restrictions not only amplify the results for the variability of labor
share but also help better explain some of the striking business cycle regularities in
emerging markets such as strongly pro-cyclical investment and counter-cyclical net
exports.
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11 Introduction
One of the stylized facts of growth is that factor income shares are stable over time.
This fact justies many economic models using constant income shares. Recently, re-
searchers have been more interested in explaining short-run uctuations and cyclical
movements of labor (income) share. However, the literature has focused on devel-
oped markets, mostly on the US and is silent on labor share uctuations in emerging
markets. In this paper we document the volatility and the cyclicality of labor share
in emerging markets and show that there is a close relationship between labor share
and the interest rate that these countries face in international markets. We then
build a model where wages have to be nanced through working capital loans and
show that the variation in the cost of borrowing can account for the movements of
the labor share over the cycle. The premise of the paper is that nancing matters to
labor share and that emerging markets serve us a good natural experiment due to
the nancial problems and the dierent features of the interest rate that they face.
Figure-1 illustrates the characteristics of labor share uctuations in both emerging
and developed markets. Labor share tends to be procyclical with output on average
in emerging markets whereas it is slightly countercyclical in developed markets.
In addition, labor share is much more volatile in low income countries. However,
there is a large variation across countries in terms of characteristics of labor share
uctuations.1 India, for instance, having the lowest income per capita in our sample
does not show a procyclical labor share whereas Korea has a strongly procyclical
labor share although it is one of the richest emerging economies. Figure-2, on the
other hand, gives us a more clear picture. It shows that labor share is procyclical
with output especially in the countries with countercyclical interest rates, i.e., a
decrease in the cost of borrowing during booms tends to increase labor share. The
more countercyclical interest rates are, the more procyclical labor share is. Moreover,
the countries that face more volatile interest rate tend to have more volatile labor
share, as well. We also show below that negative slope coecients in Figure-1
disappear when we take uctuations in the interest rate into account. Finally, these
results are robust to adjustments of the labor share that controls for self-employment
and the informal sector.
1Gollin (2002) shows that after adjustments the variation of the level of labor share across
countries does not depend on income level. Here, we show that the volatility of labor share does
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Note: corr(s,y) and sigma(s) denote the correlation of labor share with output and the standard
deviation of labor share, respectively. The variables are detrended and logged. Labor share is
annual and covers the period after 1980 for most countries. GDP per capita (PPP adjusted in US
dollars) in 2000 is taken for the income level. See the Appendix for data sources.
Figure 1: Labor Share Fluctuations across Income Level
Another striking fact is that labor share is signicantly more volatile and cyclical
in emerging markets in periods with large capital ows i.e 1980s-1990s compared to
the 1970s and 2000s. For example, the Mexican labor share did not seem to change
signicantly in 2009 when GDP dropped by 6.5% in the global crisis. However,
labor share fell by almost seven percentage points in 1995 when GDP dropped by
6.8% during the nancial turmoil in Mexico. Not surprisingly, the interest rate
on internationally traded Mexican bonds did not change signicantly in the recent
recession but Mexico experienced a large increase in the cost of borrowing as well as
other credit constraints in 1995. Motivated by these observations from across and
within country analyses, this paper concentrates on a nancial story rather than
a pure development story to understand the dynamics of labor share in dierent
country groups and dierent periods, and develop a model in which the variation in
borrowing opportunities generates movements in the labor share through working
capital mechanisms to nance labor costs.
We present a model in which labor share moves over the cycle even with a Cobb-
Douglas production function when rms have to borrow in order to pay workers
in advance before the production takes place and sales are cashed out.2 Even if
the rm uses its own resources instead of borrowing, labor decisions would still
2The use of medium or long-run post-dated checks and illiquid assets as the return to goods
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Note: corr(s,y) and sigma(s) denote the correlation of labor share with output and the standard
deviation of labor share, respectively. The variables are detrended and logged. Labor share is
annual and covers the period after 1980 for most countries. r denotes real annualized interest rates
in those countries. See the Appendix for data sources.
Figure 2: Labor Share vs. Interest Rate Fluctuations
be aected as it creates an opportunity cost in a world with a positive return on
bonds. The liquidity need to nance the wage bill makes labor demand sensitive
to interest rate changes. The duration between the time when labor income is
paid and the time when the goods market clears will create an extra cost on the
wage bill, namely interest payments to the rest of the world. During a recession,
the share of output that goes to the rest of the world increases due to the higher
interest rate which lowers the labor share of output. The introduction of limits on
the borrowing capacity generates an eective interest rate that is more responsive
than the observed one and leads to larger responses in the labor share.
In the quantitative analysis section, we calibrate the model to Mexico and show that
working capital mechanisms can generate the right comovement of the labor share
with output and explain part of the volatility in the labor share. In addition to
this eect, results are amplied when agents are credit constrained. The presence
of the binding leverage constraint not only amplies the response of labor share
but also improves the performance of the model with respect to the other business
cycle regularities in emerging markets, particularly highly procyclical investment
and countercyclical net exports with output.
wages are paid and sales are cashed out but also because of uncertainty in drawing checks which
might be high during recessions.
4Our paper is related to the literature that previously studies the dierent behavior of
interest rate that emerging markets face. As opposed to slightly procyclical interest
rates in developed markets, the countercyclical interest rates are mostly explained
by the country-risk premium (see Arellano (2008)). Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and
Uribe and Yue (2006) also show that countercyclical interest rates due to default
risk can be a propagation mechanism to generate business cycle uctuations in
this group of countries but they do not focus on the implications on labor income.
Recently, Li studies that these models along with income eect on labor supply can
explain a signicant part of the wage volatility. Here, we rstly show that these
models with working capital requirement have implications also on labor share.
Secondly, we show that under the shock processes calibrated consistently with data,
the perfect credit used in above models are not enough to match uctuations in
these countries. This is why we emphasize the imperfect credit along with working
capital requirements.
Interest rates are, indeed, not the only cost of borrowing developing countries face.
Credit frictions are also costly for these lower income countries (see Section-2 for a
literature survey). In terms of the macroeconomic implications of credit frictions,
there are numerous studies in the literature following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Bernanke et al. (1999).3 Although these studies highlight the importance of
credit frictions in developed markets, one would expect a signicant impact of these
frictions in developing countries as well especially when their relatively low level of
nancial development is considered.4 This paper stands on the same line with this
literature and claims that these models when working capital is introduced have
important implications on the short-run dynamics of labor share thanks to volatile
cost of borrowing -either the observed one in the market or the eective one through
imperfect credit.5
We also study the model performance in a developed market, Canada, and conclude
that the proposed model implies more or less stable labor share that is slightly
countercyclical with output. This is because interest rates in developed markets
3See Kocherlakota (2000), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Devereux and Yetman (2009), Jermann
and Quadrini (2006) for the use of nancial constraints.
4Calvo (1998) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) are seminal papers studying the eects
of nancial frictions on output drops in emerging markets. Recently, Mendoza (2010) points out
that the real cost of borrowing can be amplied in sudden stops through credit frictions.
5By saying imperfect credit, we not only consider credit rationing in the nancial system but
also mean leverage cycles explained by various types of asymmetric informational frictions in the
emerging market asset as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).
5display a slight positive correlation with output perhaps as a result of an increase
in marginal product of capital to a positive productivity shock (see Kydland and
Prescott, 1982) and/or the dominance of monetary authorities that might have an
impact on real variables in the short-run (see King and Watson, 1996).
Labor share movements in developed markets have already been addressed in the
literature. R os-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2009) show that when we allow labor
share to have a dynamic response, it displays an overshooting property as a response
to a positive productivity shock. Thus, labor share falls down on impact, then starts
to increase, and after a couple of quarters it passes beyond the steady-state level
and stays above the mean for a long time.6 These ndings show that there are
some mechanisms or frictions that prevent labor share from initially responding as
it does in the medium run. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1998) empirically show that
adjustment costs on labor and union wage bargaining have a signicant eect on the
movements of the labor share.7 R os-Rull and Choi (2009) emphasize the eect of
non-competitive wages and search frictions on labor share dynamics in a developed
market, the US.8 Following these papers, when the model implications of a devel-
oped and a developing country are compared, we also include an adjustment cost to
the model to investigate how much sluggishness in labor market contributes to the
cyclicality of labor share. The result is that working capital channel is the domi-
nant factor explaining labor share uctuations in emerging markets through volatile
interest rates whereas other factors producing less responsive wage bill explain the
movements in the labor share more in developed markets.
2 Labor Share and Interest Rate
2.1 The Measure of Labor Share
Labor share is computed using total compensation of employees from GDP income
accounts. In income approach, gross value added GDP is the sum of labor com-
pensation, capital income (corporate prots, interest income, rental income and
6Using Mexican quarterly data, we also nd evidence on overshooting property in labor share.
However, in this paper, we are interested in the immediate response of labor share in emerging
markets which is procyclical.
7See also Bentolila and Bertola (1990) that use ring costs to explain countercyclical labor
share in European countries.
8Boldrin and Horvath (1995) and Gomme and Greenwood (1995) use contracting model in
which wage deviates from marginal product of labor. This mechanism also makes total wage bill
less responsive to output and generate countercyclical labor share.
6depreciation), mixed income of self-employed (unincorporated income) and indirect
taxes less subsidies. Most countries ocially announce total compensation of em-
ployees, indirect taxes and the rest as operating surplus. Therefore, we measure





Since we are interested in the incomes earned by the factors of production, we
exclude government income from gross value-added. By doing this, we assume that
net indirect taxes goes both to capital and labor income. Although this is the
standard measure used in macroeconomics, it is criticized by Gollin (2002) because
it does not include labor income from self-employment which constitute a signicant
part of total employment in developing countries.9
On the other hand, ignoring self-employment in labor cost will be misleading in
terms of the cyclical component of labor share only if self-employment is cyclical
with output over the cycle. Below, we show that self-employment does not have any
systematic comovement with output eventhough total employment is highly pro-
cyclical. Nevertheless, we do corrections on labor share using approaches following
Gollin (2002). For countries that announce mixed income in their income accounts,
we exclude mixed income from GDP and look at the labor share in incorporate sec-
tor. For other countries, we use self-employment ratios from labor surveys to correct
total labor compensation when possible.
2.2 Data
We choose countries that report income accounts compiled with 1993 System of
National Accounts. Income accounts data come from OECD and UN.10 The data
is annual and we take the countries that have at least 10 annual observations in
order to have an idea on the cyclical comovement of labor share with output. This
leaves us with 18 emerging markets. Emerging economies taken here cover most
of the countries dened as emerging market in institutions providing investment
9The ratio of self-employment goes up to 30% in many low-income countries.
10OECD has longer labor compensation data for some developed countries, Mexico, and Turkey.
We check that data in OECD is consistent with data reported to UN such that results are not
changing much. Therefore, we choose longer dataset in OECD to do within country analysis for
these countries as well.
7analysis.11 In addition to emerging markets, 18 developed markets are included in
the sample for comparison. These countries are listed in Appendix. Data for most
emerging countries start at 1980s. Therefore, we take labor share data for developed
countries after 1980 for consistency, as well. For self-employment correction, we use
self-employment ratios either from OECD or ILO statistics. The details on data
sources can be found in Appendix.
As for real interest rates, Uribe and Yue (2006) has dataset on quarterly interest rates
(annualized) for emerging markets. They construct interest rates for each country
using their corresponding JP-Morgan EMBI+ spread over US T-bills. Since these
bonds are dollar denominated, real yields are calculated using current and three
preceding periods US annual ination from US-GDP deator.12 One drawback of
using these interest rates is the limited coverage especially at the annual level. For
most countries, EMBI data starts at 1994Q1 or 1999Q3 which gives us a very small
number observations at annual level. Another drawback is that these are the cost
of borrowing in US dollars. Firms which have local currency denominated assets in
their balance sheet would face an extra cost, namely exchange rate. In addition, a
varying intermediary cost (to access to international credit market) over the cycle
might make nancing more dicult, too. In order to have a longer and a more
representative interest rate data, we use domestic interest rates as well. Thanks
to small open economy assumption, domestic rates should follow world interest
rates each country faces. Indeed the patterns are similar except (see Figure-4) that
domestic rates tend to have a high volatility. Domestic rates are coming from IFS
and representing the cost of nancing short-term needs of private sector.13 GDP
deator is used to get the real interest rate. For developed economies, interest rates
come from OECD nancial indicators. These are domestic short-term (treasury bill)
interest rates on bonds that are denominated in local currency. As in the case of
emerging markets, these rates are assumed to be representative cost of borrowing
that an agent face in these economies.
11We also include Costa Rica given its relatively high per capita income and long time series
data although it is not listed as emerging market in FTSE or MSCI lists.
12Using future ination as expected ination is not changing the results very much since ination
is more or less stable in US over this period.
13Either lending or treasury bill rates are used depending on availability. If non of them is
available, money market or deposit rates are used. We checked that all types of interest rate series
move together within a country.
82.3 Observations
We document the statistics of annual labor share uctuations in Tables 3 and 4 for
emerging and developed markets, respectively.14 P-values can be found in parenthe-
sis for correlation coecients. These statistics show that labor share, on average,
is twice more volatile in emerging markets compared to developed markets. More
importantly, comovements of labor share with output dier in emerging markets
compared with developed ones. The correlation between the cyclical component of
labor share and output tends to be procyclical (0.10) in emerging markets whereas
it is negative (-0.19) in developed markets. Since there is variation among countries
in each group, we apply a sample mean test where the null hypothesis is that there
is no dierence in these correlations across dierent country groups. T-statistics
from the mean test is 3.08 which falls in the region of rejection for the signicance
level of 1%. This indicates that labor share uctuations are, indeed, statistically
dierent in emerging economies than in developed ones.
Furthermore, it can be seen in Table 3 that average procyclical labor share is mostly
driven by countries with countercyclical interest rates. In addition, Figure 2 and
3 (with domestic real rates and EMBI rates, respectively) support the claim that
procyclicality in labor share becomes more apparent as the country faces coun-
tercyclical interest rates. In statistical analysis, we take Argentina, Brazil, Czech
Republic, Egypt, Korea, Mexico, Peru and Turkey as countries having countercycli-
cal cost of borrowing.15 Then, the average correlation of labor share with output
goes up to 0.34 which shows a stronger procyclical labor share in those countries
than the average in emerging markets. Other countries in emerging group do not
have signicantly dierent movements in labor share than in developed markets.16
There is variation in terms of the dynamics of labor share among developed
economies, as well. The developed countries that tends to face countercyclical in-
terest rates such as Greece, Iceland and Sweden also tends to have procyclical labor
share. In addition, we check that, in recent crisis, there are three countries in which
labor share signicantly drops: Iceland, Ireland and Spain. Not surprisingly, these
14We also check the quarterly labor share uctuations on which we have data for only Brazil,
Korea, Mexico and Turkey. The results are very similar to annual uctuations. The author can
provide these results upon request.
15When EMBI rates are considered, interest rates still show countercyclicality with output in
these countries.
16T-stat and p-value from a sample-mean test between emerging economies that do not face
signicantly countercyclical interest rates and developed economies are 1.36 and 0.19, respectively.
9are the countries facing higher risk premium in 2009. Therefore, we claim that there
is a strong relationship between the dynamics of labor share and the risk component
in the cost of borrowing independent of development level.
The results from within country analysis also support this relationship between
labor share and the cost of borrowing. Figure 3 shows that in Mexico, where data
on labor share goes back to 1970s, the volatility and procyclicality of labor share is
so much apparent especially in 1980s and 1990s. This period is accompanied with
highly unstable nancial environment and highly volatile capital ows in and out
of the country. The comovement of labor share and output disappears when the
economy stabilizes after 2001 so does the relationship between interest rates and
output. In addition, we do not observe procyclical labor share in 1970s when there
is less nancial liberalization. The results are similar in Korea except that we do
observe procyclicality in labor share in 1970s, as well but we veried that Korean
interest rates are still countercyclical with output in 1970s, too.
Lastly, we want to discuss labor share movements in the recent crisis in emerging
economies. National income accounts for these countries are not readily available
yet. However, total labor compensation index in manufacturing in Mexico has some
clues on Mexican labor share in the recent crisis. This index shows a 8.5% drop
in total compensation in manufacturing and GDP drops by 7% in 2009 in Mexico.
This implies no signicant change in labor share especially when it is considered
that manufacturing sector is highly responsive to changes in GDP. Not surprisingly,
Mexico did not face severe diculties in borrowing so that bid yields on US-dollar-
denominated Mexican bonds do not show a signicant upward movement in recent
crisis, nor does real domestic rates.17 On the other hand, the same compensation
index dropped by approximately 20% in the crisis year of 1995 when GDP dropped
by 6.5%, and the country was experiencing diculties to nance its expenses either
because of high cost of borrowing or the quantity restrictions on loans. Therefore,
these observations from both across and within country analyses motivated us to
explore the eects of nancing labor cost on the share of income going to labor.
Self-employment Adjustments:
In this section, we discuss how sensitive the observations in Table 1 are to corrections
with self-employment. We apply two adjustment methods to take into account the
17Financial Times reports that bid yields on US-dollar-denominated Mexican bonds are around
5-6% in January-2008. It remained unchanged during the 2008-2009 crisis whereas they increased
to 20% from 10% levels in 1995.
10labor income of self-employed people. The rst method is to take just incorporated
businesses when computing labor share. This requires a deduction in value added
GDP by an amount equal to self-employed income (mixed income):
Adj-1 : Labor Share =
Labor Compensation
Value Added GDP - Mixed Income
Above adjustment assumes that labor share is same across incorporated and
unincorporated (self-employed) enterprises and can be applied only to countries
that report mixed income in their national accounts. For those that do not report
it, we compute a proxy for labor income of a self-employed person and then adjust
the overall economy labor share using self-employment data for those countries:
Adj-2 : Labor Share =
Labor Comp. + Labor Income per Self-Emp.  Self-Emp
Value Added GDP
Labor compensation per employee calculated by total labor compensation divided
by the number of employees can potentially be a proxy the labor income of a self-
employed person as in Gollin (2002). However, the assumption that the labor cost of
a self-employed is equal to the labor compensation per employee might not be valid
for some countries. This method, indeed, lifts the level of labor share up to a very
high fraction of income in countries where self-employment ratio is high.18 Korean
labor share, for example, rises to 80-90% levels after this correction. We then checked
household surveys in Korea and Turkey, and veried that self-employed people earn
less than wage-earners. This includes possible capital income from their jobs as well.
The reason is perhaps because a big part of self-employment is coming from rural
areas or because there are dierences in terms of skills across average workers and
self-employed people. Another explanation might be that self-employment heavily
relies on informal sector where the administrative cost of labor such as labor income
tax and social security payments do not show up. Therefore, we assume that the
labor income of a self-employed is half of the labor cost of an employee in Korea and
Turkey.19 For other countries, we continue to assume equal labor cost across wage
earners and own-account workers. Hence, the dierences between baseline labor
share and the adjusted one should be considered as upper limit for these countries.
18Korea and Turkey have the highest self-employment ratio in our sample. Half of employed
people are working on their own account. The average is around 30% in developing group whereas
12% in developed economies.
19Household surveys tell us that total gross income of self-employed person is around 60-65%
of average wage level.
11The results for adjusted labor share are listed in Table 3. There are only minor
changes after self-employment corrections. Adjusted labor share still shows a high
volatility. In terms of the cyclical comovement of labor share with output, changes
are so small that adjustment does not alter the sign of correlation between labor
share and output. This shows that the high procyclicality of labor share in countries
such as Argentina, Korea and Mexico is not a measurement error from a calculation
that ignores self-employment.
The reason why self-employment is not a concern here is because this part of em-
ployment does not show a signicant countercyclical movements with output. Table
5 shows the correlations of cyclical components of self-employment and total em-
ployment with output. Although self-employment is less correlated with output
compared with total employment, this is not enough to reverse the results on overall
labor share. In addition, the information on mixed income tells us that the contri-
bution of self-employment to GDP is only around 10-15% although self-employment
constitute around 30% of total employment.
Discussion on Sectoral Shifts and Informal Sector
Another driving force in change of labor share might be shifts across sectors over the
cycle. Moreover, government expenditure can also amplify these shifts by investing
on labor intensive sectors and indeed government expenditure is procyclical in these
countries. In an empirical work, Kabaca (2010) shows that the change in labor share
is mostly coming from within sectoral changes when the countries with procyclical
labor share are analyzed. We also check if the overall economy labor share is driven
by cyclical government spending or not. However, business sector labor share ex-
cluding public sectors such as health, education and public administration is still
volatile and procyclical and these sectors are driving 70-80% of GDP in most of the
countries.
Another important issue for low-income countries is the high ratios of informal em-
ployment. On the other hand, labor compensation estimates mostly rely on labor
cost in the formal sector. Similar to the concern with self-employment, the exclu-
sion of labor compensation in the informal sector might be misleading in the results
of labor share cyclicality if the total labor compensation depends more on informal
sector in recessions. If that were true, then we should observe more procyclical labor
share because of this measurement problem especially in countries with high ratios
of informality. However, we do not see that type of link between informality and
12procyclicality in developing countries. India, for example, as a country having one
of highest informality in our sample does not have procyclical labor share whereas
Korea having less informality shows a procyclical labor share.20 In addition, the
contribution of informal sector to GDP is small (ocial estimate from Mexico sug-
gests that it is around 12% although the informal sector employment is 30% of total
employment) and is not showing countercyclicality with output.21
2.4 Interest Rates and Financial Environment
The variation in interest rates emerging markets face in international markets is
widely discussed in the macro literature. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and
Yue (2006) document the countercyclical behavior of interest rates for a number of
emerging markets. Here, we show that domestic real rates (Table 3) also support
this behavior. As in previous studies, Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Turkey
exhibit highly countercyclical interest rates whereas Philippines and South Africa
have a cost of borrowing that mildly responds to output changes. The countercyclical
movement of interest rate is mostly explained by default risk variation over the
cycle. Arellano (2008) derives high probabilities of default in equilibrium during a
recession when there is less incentive for repayment in incomplete markets. This,in
turn, leads to higher interest rates and consequently causes more output contractions
(see Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006)).
During nancial distress, borrowing becomes not only more costly but also more
limited to agents that will engage risky investment activities. Thus, agent-principal
problem might be even more apparent during recessions. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
explains credit rationing as an equilibrium phenomena in an environment where
agents dier in terms of their risk and nancial markets are monopolistically compet-
itive. Indeed, macroeconomic implications of nancial frictions are heavily touched
in the literature. Examples in developed market literature include Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) which address the high cost of recessions when the agents are
credit constrained.
In emerging markets, these frictions are still important especially when their level of
nancial development is considered. In an empirical study, Arteta and Hale (2008)
20See Kabaca (2010) for empirical details on this.
21See Garcia-Verdu (2007).
13nds that crisis are accompanied with a sharp decrease in foreign credit when rm-
specic and country-specic characteristics are controlled and that credit remains
at low levels for a couple of quarters and only recovers after macro fundamentals
recover. In theoretical perspective, the eects of nancial frictions on large output
drops in emerging markets have been emphasized by Aghion et al. (2001), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Calvo (1998). Moreover, Mendoza and Smith (2006)
and Mendoza (2010) stress the importance of nancial frictions on the crashes of
asset prices in emerging markets.
Empirical studies on the leverage ratio (measured as debt liabilities over market
value of equity, or total credit as a percentage of output) also have some clues
on large credit booms and sharp declines. Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Mendoza
and Terrones (2008) show that credit expansions play a signicant role for output
expansions in emerging countries. In fact, private credit to GDP ratio displays a
positive movement with output in these countries. We show below that perfect credit
markets with highly volatile and countercyclical interest rates are having hard time
to explain these large credit expansions and procyclical leverage ratios. Previous
studies deliver some explanations on volatile credit such as poor monitoring on
banks' lending activities,22 bailout guarantees aggravating moral hazard issues,23 and
directing credits to risky projects, and imperfection in credit markets serving as a
nancial accelerator.24 Considering these possible explanations on credit expansions
ans empirical evidence on credit restrictions, we take a simple reduced form of
leverage constraint to explore the eects of imperfect credit markets on nancing
labor.
3 Model
The model is in the class of small open economy models with an internationally
traded single good. Asset markets are incomplete in the sense that there is only a
single internationally traded one-period bond which pays the buyer a predetermined
interest. Agents face shocks to interest rate on bonds and productivity level. These
shocks follow exogenous processes, details of which are described below. The only
dierence from a standard RBC model is that wage payments has to be paid in-
advance and the country is credit constrained.
22See Lorenzoni (2008) that points out the need for nancial supervision as a second-best option.
23see Ranciere et al. (2008) and Schneider and Tornell (2004)
24See Gourinchas et al. (2001) for a summary of these explanations.
143.1 Optimization Problem
Let us consider an economy with innitely-lived self-employed representative house-
hold.25 The agent derives utility from consumption ct and leisure 1   lt where the
total time that he devotes to labor and leisure is normalized to one. His preferences
are described as in the following:
P1
t=0 tEtu(ct   N(lt)) (2)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor, u(:) is twice-continuously-dierentiable and
concave period utility function, and N(:) expresses the disutility of labor which is
twice-continuously-dierentiable and convex function. This utility representation is
known as GHH preferences after Greenwood et al. (1988). These preferences elim-
inate wealth eect and makes labor supply decisions independent of consumption.
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) shows that standard Cobb-Douglass utility function
generates large wealth eects if interest rates are volatile and countercyclical, and
results in an acyclical employment which is counterfactual. An alternative to this
form would be to use standard preferences with asset market segmentation to lessen
the eect of interest rates on labor supply decisions. However, we choose this specic
form due to its simplicity to deal with wealth eect.
The agent maximizes the life-time expected utility and choose the optimal sequences
of consumption, labor, investment and bond holdings subject to budget and leverage
constraints:
ct + xt + bt + (bt)  yt   (Rt   1)wtlt + Rt 1bt 1 (3)
bt   Rtwtlt    tyt (4)
Income, in this economy, is generated by producing a single traded good, yt, using a
constant-returns-to-scale technology which has capital kt and labor lt as the factors
of production. The technology in the production function, yt = AtF(kt;lt), is subject
to TFP shocks. The agent chooses investment level xt, in order to accumulate capital
by taking into account that capital depreciates at a rate, . Capital accumulation
25This is similar to the yeoman-farmer model in which the farmer uses his own labor to produce
the good and is widely used in monetary literature (see Ball and Romer (1990) and Mankiw (1985)).
The alternative is to use a decentralized representation which has household and rms as separate
agents but we choose this type of modeling since it allows us to impose a constraint on the whole
nationwide debt including both household debt and working capital loans (see Mendoza (2010)).
15Figure 3: Timing Line
follow the law of motion, xt = kt+1   (1   )kt + (kt+1;kt) where (kt+1;kt) is
a quadratic convex capital adjustment cost to mitigate the excessive volatility of
investment that might arise in the small open economy models. The agent can also
trade an international one-period bond bt in the market that has a gross return Rt:
A quadratic convex cost function, (bt), is introduced into the model as in Schmitt-
Groh e and Uribe (2003) to ensure a stationary path for bond holdings.26
The model has a wage bill nancing, that is, a fraction  of wage bill has to be paid
in-advance before the production takes place. This can be rationalized either by the
fact that workers want to consume in the beginning of the period but cannot access
the nancial markets or by having a production line where rms use installments or
post-dated checks so that sales are cashed out in later periods. In the model, these
working capital loans are borrowed in the beginning of the period from international
markets at the same rate on the bond, Rt, after the shock is realized and generate
interest payments in the end of the period to the rest of the world (see Figure-3 for
a representation of the timing line). That is why income net of these payments are
entered in the right-hand-side the budget constraint. Labor market is competitive,
therefore, the wage is taken as given by the representative agent and equals to the
marginal disutility of labor, wt = @N(lt)=@lt where lt is the market average. This
is similar to the optimal labor supply in a decentralized competitive equilibrium
26This cost is zero in imperfect credit since non-stationarity does not exist in this case and it
is so small in perfect credit case that it does not aect the long-run business cycle implications of
the model.
16set-up.
The economy also faces an external leverage constraint (4). The net foreign asset
is constrained by a fraction of output,   t. In other words, net debt including
working capital loans has to be smaller than a  t fraction of output. This frac-
tion has a stochastic component and is varying over time. Ludvigson (1999) nds
that forecastable (ex-ante) credit growth has a signicant inuence on consumption
that is independent of variation in predictable income growth and that introduc-
ing a stochastic upper limit on the debt-to-output ratio improves the correlation
between consumption and income growth in the US. The high correlation between
(detrended) consumption and income appears in emerging markets, as well.27 In
our exercise with perfect credit markets, we show below that the model with work-
ing capital cannot account for highly volatile (and highly cyclical) consumption and
countercyclical net exports even in the presence of countercyclical interest rates
whereas a stochastic leverage constraint can improve these results.28
Another issue is the frequency of binding situations which is dicult to pin down
from data. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) shows that nancial imperfection as in the
form of quantity restrictions can be an opt imal equilibrium outcome when there
are asymmetric informational costs in the environment. We assume the existence of
these costs at every state creating unsatised borrowers which implies a permanently
binding constraint. Considering the low levels of nancial development in emerging
markets, these kind of constraints are more likely to bind. And in this paper, we
narrow our scope to see how the presence of binding constraints interact with working
capital rather than trying to explore how often these constraints bind. Since the
constraint is binding,  t represents the leverage ratio of the economy as the net debt
over GDP. Motivated by interest rates being an important driving force in emerging
markets, the leverage ratio moves over the cycle in the following:
b  t =   b Rt (5)
where  > 0. As mentioned above, since nancial imperfection can be derived
endogenously through asymmetric cost channels, interest rates would not be a bad
27see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) for the documentation of business cycle regularities in emerg-
ing markets.
28Sarquis (2008) and Guajardo (2004) also explore the eects of these types of credit shocks
in emerging markets' business cycles. The dierence here is that we introduce working capital
channel in order to explore the eect of changes in the eective cost of borrowing on labor market
variables.
17choice explaining the behavior of restriction on credit.29 That is, monopolistically
competitive banks will not only charge high interest rates but also impose tighter
restrictions on credit when the asymmetric cost is higher. This specication implies
a one-to-one relation between interest rates and leverage ratio in the model since the
constraint is always binding. Indeed domestic credit-to-gdp ratio for non-nancial
rms provided by banking system shows us a high correlation of -0.60 with interest
rates in Mexico.
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium and Labor Share
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of sequences of optimal alloca-
tions fct;lt;kt+1;bt;xtg and wages fwtg such that
1. the representative agent solves the maximization problem subject to budget
and collateral constraints in (2), taking as given wages, interest rate and initial
states k0 and b0,
2. wage equals to marginal disutility of labor wt = @N(lt)=@lt, and
3. labor decisions satisfy lt = lt
The system of equations from optimization problem look similar to the ones from
a standard SOE-RBC model except the eect of working capital on optimal labor
decision and of credit constraint on bond holding, capital accumulation and labor
equations. The key equation determining labor share is the rst order condition for
hours worked:
u2(ct;lt) + t[AtF2(kt;lt)   (Rt   1)wt] + t[ tAtF2(kt;lt)   Rtwt] = 0 (6)
where t and t are the Lagrange multipliers on budget and borrowing constraints
at period t, respectively.
t
t can be seen as a shadow price of credit constraint
in marginal units of consumption. Equation (4) represents the labor demand in




u1(ct;lt), we can rewrite equation (4) as:










Now, let us consider the eects of working capital and credit constraint on labor
share. In order to see the contribution of each friction, we rstly suppose that the
upper limit on borrowing is innitely high, i.e., the agent is not credit-constrained
implying that t = 0 for every t. Assuming the production function is in Cobb-






1 + (Rt   1)
(perfect credit) (8)
where st is the labor share at period t and  is the capital exponent in the production
function. Equation (6) tells us that labor share would still be moving even when the
credit market is frictionless since wages deviate from marginal product of labor.30
An increase (decrease) in interest rates drives the wages to a lower (higher) level than
the marginal product of labor which shrinks (increases) the labor share of income
and increases (decreases) the share of the interest payments in output.
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If the increase in Rt is accompanied with credit rationing implying that
t
t and Rt
are positively correlated, an increase in Rt will further increase the eective interest
rate and inuence the labor share more adversely. Intiutively, the demand for labor
is lowered not only because of the higher cost of borrowing but also the higher credit
restrictions imposed by lenders. Note that since labor decisions aect output which
tightens or loosens the credit constraint,
t
t t appears in the nominator. However,
because
t
t and  t are moving in dierent directions over the cycle, the impact is
mostly driven by the denominator.





t kt   (1 + (Rt   1))wtlt
This maximization problem produces the same labor share as in the equation (6) when Cobb-
Douglass production function is taken.
194 Calibration
The model is calibrated to Mexico quarterly. The sample period is 1987Q1-2008Q4.
4.1 Shocks
Solow residuals are used as the measure of productivity. We calculate Solow residuals
using Mexican GDP from OECD. lnAt = ln(yt)   ln(kt)   (1   )ln(lt). Capital
exponent is set to match average labor share (see below). Employment series come
from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and we extend it to 2008Q4 using series at ILO.
In order to nd total labor input used in production, we calculate total hours by
the given employment series and hours worked in manufacturing from OECD for
Mexico. Capital stock series are constructed using investment perpetual method.




y. Assuming, there is a constant growth rate on the path for the
rst ten quarters, we nd the approximate initial capital stock. Then, we extend the
capital stock data using investment series from OECD. Detrended Solow residuals
suggest an AR(1) coecient of 0.70 and standard deviation of 1.44% of shocks to
TFP. These results imply less persistent and volatile shocks as it is the case in
emerging markets.
For interest rates, we take \average cost of borrowing" series reported by IFS over
the sample period.31 GDP deator is used to deate the interest rate. Since we
are not interested in modeling ination, we assume that agents perfectly foresee
ination, and thus use future ination in calculation of real interest rates.32 The
previous literature commonly used JP-Morgan EMBI+ spreads for emerging markets
but we think that domestic interest rates might be a better representative cost of
borrowing for domestic agents. In fact, interest rates using EMBI+ spreads have a
very small volatility in terms of quarterly yields. For example, in Mexico, average
real interest rate from EMBI+ is 2.2% and have standard deviation of 0.55% at
31We take the rst two-years observations out of the sample since it represents abnormal changes
from -20% to 100% of real return. We are doing this in order for results not to be driven by these
variations.
32Note that using dierent types of expected ination such as an average of past ination rates
still suggest a very volatile interest rates but we think that using current or past ination in an
environment with highly volatile ination might be fallacious. The behavior of domestic interest
rates is consistent with Kaminsky et al. (2004). They show that domestic interest rates are volatile
and counter-cyclical in most of the developing countries.
20the quarterly frequency. On the other hand domestic interest rates are almost four
times more volatile. There might be several reasons for this. First of all, domestic
rms, instead of issuing bonds internationally, most of the time access international
nancing through domestic banks and/or government in these economies. Risk on
these institutions and on typical agents in domestic market might dier substantially
or intermediation costs might be volatile on domestic agents.33 Firms that are
doing international lending might dier from rms doing domestic lending in terms
of their riskiness as well. Moreover, Kaminsky et al. (2004) shows that monetary
policies are pro-cyclical with output in emerging markets. These policies (such as
increasing nominal interest rates to prevent capital outows) might have an impact
on real interest rate as well. Thirdly, EMBI rates are the returns on US-dollar
denominated assets. Domestic rms having asset position mostly in local currency
should also take variation in exchange rate into consideration in order to prevent the
problems arising from currency mismatch. Because we want to keep the simplicity
of the model, we take the eect of these channels exogenous to agents and use
domestic interest rates.34 The average of annualized real interest rate is 5.33% and
the standard deviation of detrended annualized interest rate is 8.13% which suggest
2.04% at quarterly yields. AR(1) of these detrended interest rates suggests 0.65 as
correlation coecient and 1.65% as standard deviation of shocks to interest rate.
Since there are two shocks in the model, correlation between them has to be checked
to see if they have feedback from each other. Indeed, Uribe and Yue (2006) shows
that country spread shocks emerging markets face are not independent to domestic
situation. The correlation between detrended TFP and interest rate is -0.44. We
apply a VAR estimation to get a better idea how shocks to these variables are
correlated. Below is the VAR estimation results with variance-covariance matrix for
the shocks. Covariance matrix suggests a correlation of -0.40 between two shocks.







b Rt = 0:05 b At 1 + 0:60b Rt 1 + r
t
33The idea here is that banks might charge typical agents a higher intermediation cost during
recessions, i.e they choose to lend government since rms are riskier. However the risk gap between
government and rms becomes smaller during booms and they charge a lower intermediation cost
which creates an even higher volatility in interest rates.
34Note that endogenizing domestic interest rates using one of the possible channels mentioned
above will not change the impact of working capital on labor share since the mechanism gener-
ates a reduced form of labor share -equation (6)- that has only interest rate as the time-varying
component.
21As of stochastic leverage ratio, we set  in equation (3) to be 1.5 so that the standard
deviation of  t matches the standard deviation of domestic credit-to-gdp ratio over
the sample period.
4.2 Other Model Parameters
Bond holdings cost function and capital adjustment cost functions are quadratic
functions: (:) = 
2yt(bt




kt )2 respectively where b is
steady-state level of bond holdings-to- GDP ratio, and  and  are the parameters
that determine the size of the costs.  is set very low so that it does not aect short-
run dynamics over the cycle very much but gives us a stationary bond holdings. We
set  is to match investment volatility in Mexico over the period taken and b to
match the steady-state net foreign assets in this economy, bt   Rtwtlt. Steady-
state net foreign asset to GDP ratio, -0.42 is coming from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) data set for Mexico. We set  = 1 or  = 0:66 implying that there is around
either 3 months or 2 months dierence between the times when labor and capital
incomes are earned generating liquidity need for nancing labor income.35 When
self-employment and possible dierences in up-front wage payments across sectors
are considered, we think that it is reasonable to set a working capital lower than
one as a robustness check.








Intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0.2 implying  = 5 in (??) following
Neumeyer and Perri (2005). Using the optimal labor supply equation at the steady
state, labor weight parameter  in the utility function is set to match l = 0:32 which
is the fraction of hours worked in the total non-sleeping hours. OECD manufacturing
total hours worked is used in the calculation of the steady state value of hours, l.
In the model,  determines the elasticity of labor, 1
 1. The empirical evidence on
this parameter is mostly coming from developed markets and the values used in the
literature are in the range [0.5,1]. Considering their lower income and wealth we
assume that agents in emerging markets stand closer to lower bound of this range
35Unfortunately, there is not a good estimate for this parameter. Calibration results using loans
data might not be reliable either since the agents might nance wage bill using their own savings.
As mentioned above this would still create an opportunity cost in a modied model where rms
borrow from households to nance wage bill in addition to investment.
22and set the value of  to 2.75 showing an elasticity of labor, 0.57 which implies a
standard deviation of hours closer to data. Although this parameter is not crucial
for the results on labor share uctuations, it changes how the movements in the
wage bill are split between the labor input and hourly wages.
Using the average interest rate level and depreciation rate, we extract the values for
discount factor and steady-state shadow price of credit constraint simultaneously
from optimal bond holding and capital equations at steady state. Calculations re-
sult in  = 0:98 and

 = 0:01. Capital exponent is set to 0.43 to match average labor
share in Mexico, i.e.,  is coming from 1 
1+r = 0:57. The labor share using National
Account data is very small (around 0.33) since it is suering from measurement
problem such as informal employment and self-employment labor income. Labor
compensation data from National Account is mostly coming from formal sector.
The data on the contribution of informal sector to Mexican GDP from 1993-2004 is
available. Informal sector contributes 13% of value added GDP on average. Assum-
ing the labor share is the same in both sectors36, we recalculated the labor share
by removing the informal sector from GDP and then adjusting labor compensation
data using self-employment ratio which is approximately 0.33 in Mexico.
5 Results
Table 6 contains the implications of dierent versions of the model along with the
second moments from data.37 The data moments represent quarterly variations after
taking logs (except net export-GDP ratio and net interest rate) and HP-ltering
using 1600 as the smoothing parameter.38 We use quarterly labor share data in
manufacturing as a proxy of overall labor share uctuations in the economy. We
check that, at the annual level, series from both manufacturing and total economy is
highly correlated to each other (0.86) and have large standard deviation of 4.5 and
3.5 in the manufacturing and overall economy, respectively. The second column lists
the moments from the standard SOE-RBC model for comparison and the remaining
columns document the results of the model described above in both cases of perfect
and imperfect credit markets for dierent values of working capital parameter.
36Note that one can imagine a higher labor share for informal sector. However, since its contri-
bution is smaller in value, having a higher labor share in this sector would not change the results
very much.
37See the appendix for data sources in detail.
38We apply ARIMA-X12 from Census Bureau to deseasonalize data if we observe signicant
seasonal eects.
23To begin with, the results from the standard RBC model can not explain any dy-
namics in labor share simply because Cobb-Douglass production implies a constant
labor share in a competitive environment where wage is equal to marginal product of
labor. Consequently, it cannot account for the volatility in labor market variables.
As mentioned earlier, real wages are more volatile than output in emerging markets
but even with relatively inelastic labor supply, RBC is having hard time to explain
highly volatile wages. The standard model is also doing a poor job in explaining
highly volatile consumption and net exports-GDP ratio since agents tend to smooth
their consumption using credit markets.
We now continue with the results from the model with working capital. The intro-
duction of working capital without any limits on borrowing (columns 3 and 5) can
generate variations in labor share. Because interest rates are countercyclical, work-
ing capital requirement tends to produce a larger response in labor demand than in
RBC model. As a consequence, it can be seen that wages and hours become more
volatile in these models. Having more volatile wage bill results in a procyclical labor
share consistent wit data. Although the model is doing a good job in predicting the
movements of labor share with output, the volatility depends heavily on working
capital parameter, . A smaller value for this parameter lowers the volatility of labor
share.
The models with perfect credit can explain neither of the strong countercyclicality
in net exports-GDP nor the strong procyclicality in investment although the cost
of borrowing is volatile and moving negatively with output.39 This is because un-
der relatively less persistent shocks, investment is less cyclical with current output
and the smoothing behavior is still dominant. Consequently, net exports become
procyclical (or acyclical) in the perfect credit market. On the other hand, when
leverage constraint is introduced (columns 5 and 6), smoothing behavior disappears
and the credit cycles, because of imperfection in capital markets, generate second
moments closer to data. As a result, net exports become more volatile and strongly
countercyclical with output consistent with data.
Imperfect credit market along with working capital also contributes to the volatility
of labor share thanks to a fraction of wage bill in the nationwide debt. Now, even
39Assuming a higher parameter for elasticity of intertemporal substitution and/or making shocks
more persistent decreases the correlation between net-exports and output only to -0.15 which leaves
still signicant comovement unexplained. See Li (2010) and Mendoza (2010).
24with a lower working capital parameter (column 6), the model can explain a signi-
cant part of volatility. Considering some industries where working capital might be
of less importance, borrowing limit gives us more exibility to set a lower working
capital than it is used in the literature.
The models mentioned here implies a very procyclical wages. On the other hand,
wages are mot strongly cyclical (0.45) in data. This smaller cyclicality is a well-
known fact in developed markets as well, where wages are even acyclical.40 Wage
rigidities through contracting models (see Gomme and Greenwood (1995)) and the
change of skill composition of labor (see Bils (1985)) over the cycle can possibly make
aggregate wages less cyclical. However, introducing these features into the model
will increase the importance of working capital and the cost of borrowing since they
tend to decrease the volatility of wages and make labor share countercyclical whereas
working capital implies a procyclical one.
6 Implications on Developed Economies
In this section, we want to show the performance of the model in a developed
market, and calibrate it to Canada. Then we compare and contrast the results with
the implications for Mexico. We, here, take the model with imperfect credit market
and a working capital requirement of 0.66 as the baseline model.
As mentioned earlier, the literature suggests mechanisms for countercyclicality of la-
bor share in developed markets through less responsive wage bill to output changes.
High unionization (especially in Europe), ring and search costs and optimal labor
contracts for workers' insurance imply sluggishness either on wages or on the quan-
tity of labor.41 Based on these explanations, for a representation of labor market
rigidities, we also include an adjustment cost on labor to understand how they in-
teract with working capital and contribute to the variability of labor share. These
rigidities or regulations in labor market can be expected in emerging markets, as
well.42 Therefore, by having adjustment costs on labor, we also want to see if they
40See R os-Rull and Choi (2009) and Li (2010) for the recent wage-output correlations in US
and other developed markets.
41There are also other axplanations on the countercyclicality of labor share in developed mar-
kets. See Hansen and Prescott (2005) which introduces occasionally binding capacity constraints
implying procyclical capital share, and consequently countercyclical labor share with output.
42Heckman et al. (2000) for example, show that protection on employment is in high levels
in Latin American countries. Moreover, OECD protection index also indicates that Mexico and
Turkey have much more protection on labor than the average among OECD countries.
25undo the results of baseline model in emerging economies explained in the previous
section.




lt 1 )2. This cost has a signicant eect on autocorrelation of hours. There-
fore, l parameter is set to match the autocorrelation of hours in data which is 0.69
and 0.66 in Mexico and Canada, respectively. For other parameters in calibration
of Canadian economy, we follow similar approaches we do for Mexico except that
we assume a higher labor elasticity (unit elasticity as in literature) and a lower 
representing a higher level of nancial development (or better nancial supervision).
The results can be seen in Table 7. The baseline model, when it is calibrated to
Canada, can generate a countercyclical labor share since interest rates are slightly
procyclical in Canada. As a response to positive productivity shock, higher interest
rate mitigates the response of labor demand and wage bill to output producing a
countercyclical labor share. However, since interest rates are not showing a high
variability, the model can only explain a very small part of volatility in labor share
in Canada.
On the other hand, the modied version of the model with the adjustment cost on
labor can explain more variation in labor share. Sluggish labor makes wage bill less
responsive to output and contributes to the cyclicality and volatility of labor share as
the previous work in literature suggests. Therefore, working capital and labor market
rigidities are working in the same direction in explaining the movements of labor
share in developed markets. Since the interest rates are not volatile in developed
markets, the eect of working capital is minimal. However, emerging markets serve
us a good natural experiment with their dierent behavior of interest rates. In
the emerging model economy, introducing labor market rigidities cannot oset the
eect of working capital on labor share because interest rates are much more volatile.
Without working capital, labor share turns to be negatively correlated with output
which is counterfactual. This suggests that working capital is the dominant factor
in determining the movements of labor share.
267 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that emerging markets tend to have a more volatile and
procyclical labor share as opposed to a relatively stable and countercyclical one in
developed markets. Procyclicality increases as the country faces stronger counter-
cyclical interest rates. We, then, explore the eect of nancing labor and show that
working capital can be a good mechanism generating uctuations in labor share con-
sistent with data. The liquidity need for labor payments imposes a burden on the
cost of labor and leads to a more (less) responsive wage bill when interest rates are
countercyclical (procyclical) with output. Since interest rates in dierent country
groups move in opposite directions over the cycle, the eect of cost of borrowing is
dierent across these groups implying a procyclical labor share in emerging markets
and a countercyclical one in developed markets. Introducing other nancial prob-
lems that emerging economies encounter such as credit frictions amplies the results
by making the eective interest rate more volatile than the observed one. Binding
leverage constraint not only contributes to the variability in labor share but also im-
proves the model performance in terms of other business cycle regularities in these
economies such as highly volatile consumption, strongly countercyclical net exports
and procyclical investment.
Following the literature on labor share in developed economies, we also include ad-
justment cost on labor as a representation of the slower adjustment in labor market.
Without working capital, these models tend to produce counterfactual labor share
uctuations in emerging markets by making wage bill less responsive to output.
On the other hand, they can contribute to labor share uctuations in developed
markets. In short, nancing labor income plays an important role on labor share
movements in an environment where the cost of borrowing varies associated with
unstable nancial markets. On the other hand, labor market rigidities generating
less responsive wage bill such as costs on labor adjustment (hiring and ring costs),
wage bargaining and/or contracting are more likely to dominate working capital
channels in countries where nancial markets are stable. We leave as a future re-
search to better understand the interaction between labor market specic rigidities
and nancing wage payments.
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31Appendix: Data Sources
Period Compensation Interest
& GDP (VA) Rates (IFS)
Emerging Markets
Argentina 1993-2007 UN lending rate (IFS)
Brazil 1992-2007 UN T-bill rate (IFS)
Chile 1981-2007 UN lending rate (IFS)
Columbia 1992-2007 UN lending rate (IFS)
Costa Rica 1982-2007 UN lending rate (IFS)
Czech Rep. 1992-2008 OECD lending rate (IFS)
Egypt 1996-2006 UN lending rate (IFS)
Hungary 1995-2008 OECD lending rate (IFS)
India 1981-2002 UN lending rate (IFS)
Israel 1995-2007 UN lending rate (IFS)
Korea 1981-2008 OECD corporate bond rate (IFS)
Mexico 1981-2008 OECD ave cost of borr. (IFS)
Peru 1986-2006 UN lending rate (IFS)
Philippines 1992-2007 UN T-bill rate (IFS)
Poland 1991-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Russia 1995-2008 UN lending rate (IFS)
South Afr. 1981-2008 UN T-bill rate (IFS)
Turkey 1987-2006 UN money market (IFS)
Developed Markets
Australia 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Austria 1990-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Canada 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Denmark 1987-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Finland 1987-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
France 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Germany 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Greece 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (IFS)
Iceland 1988-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Ireland 1984-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Italy 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Netherlands 1986-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
New Zealand 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Norway 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Spain 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Sweden 1982-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
United Kingdom 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
United States 1981-2008 OECD T-bill rate (OECD)
Note: Compensation is the compensation of employees in GDP-national accounts from income
approach.
32GDP deator
The data source is either OECD or IFS. For each country, interest rates and GDP
deators are coming from the same source.
EMBI rates
The data on EMBI spreads for emerging economies come from Uribe and Yue (2006)
dataset.






































Note: corr(s,y) and corr(r,y) denote the correlation of labor share with output and of interest
rate with output, respectively. Interest rate data covers 1994Q1-2005Q1 for most countries and
constructed using EMBI spread data from Uribe and Yue (2006) except Argentina. Interest rate
data for Argentina (1983Q1-2005Q1) comes from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) until 2001Q2, we
then extend the data using EMBI rates from Uribe and Yue (2006).








































































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Labor Share Output
Note: The variables are de-trended using HP-lter. Y-axis shows percentage deviations from the levels.
35Table 1: Volatility and Correlations in Emerging Markets
(s) (s,y) (r) (r,y) (r,s)
Argentina 5.02 0.56 7.8 -0.57 -0.57
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Brazil 2.38 0.03 4.08 -0.36 -0.08
(0.92) (0.22) (0.39)
Chile 2.36 -0.12 4.67 -0.02 0.19
(0.54) (0.89) (0.32)
Colombia 1.22 -0.06 5.21 0.42 -0.25
(0.88) (0.02) (0.36)
Costa Rica 2.92 -0.22 4.53 -0.03 -0.05
(0.26) (0.88) (0.82)
Czech Rep. 1.37 0.27 2.30 -0.16 0.03
(0.30) (0.55) (0.92)
Egypt 1.29 0.18 1.93 -0.40 -0.60
(0.58) (0.27) (0.02)
Hungary 1.14 0.12 2.17 0.06 -0.11
(0.67) (0.83) (0.71)
India 1.17 -0.44 2.89 0.22 -0.52
(0.04) (0.33) (0.01)
Israel 1.71 0.17 1.94 0.10 -0.31
(0.57) (0.74) (0.31)
Korea 1.36 0.45 1.83 -0.57 -0.20
(0.02) (0.01) (0.31)
Mexico 3.72 0.60 9.10 -0.56 -0.66
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Peru 2.30 0.36 7.01 -0.16 0.02
(0.07) (0.52) (0.92)
Philippines 2.10 0.02 2.33 -0.03 -0.09
(0.95) (0.92) (0.74)
Poland 1.97 -0.19 3.45 0.44 -0.35
(0.46) (0.08) (0.17)
Russia 4.8 -0.12 3.22 0.20 -0.70
(0.68) (0.49) (0.02)
South Africa 1.47 -0.06 2.18 0.16 0.11
(0.76) (0.41) (0.59)
Turkey 6.40 0.25 9.66 -0.49 -0.24
(0.30) (0.02) (0.31)
Mean 2.48 0.10 4.27 -0.10 -0.24
Mean* 2.98 0.34 5.49 -0.41 -0.29
Note: P-values are in parenthesis.   denote standard deviation and correlation. Mean* represents
the average for countercyclical facing countercyclical interest rates. Interest rates are net annual
domestic rates from IFS. See the data appendix for sources.
36Table 2: Volatility and Correlations in Developed Markets
(s) (s,y) (r) (r,y) (r,s)
Australia 1.05 -0.41 1.45 -0.03 0.62
(0.02) (0.50) (0.0)
Austria 0.65 -0.29 0.65 0.40 -0.06
(0.08) (0.08) (0.80)
Canada 1.06 -0.58 1.30 0.37 -0.22
(0.0) (0.06) (0.26)
Denmark 1.18 -0.38 1.16 -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (0.0) (0.81)
Finland 1.74 -0.29 1.79 0.15 0.32
(0.13) (0.49) (0.14)
France 0.50 -0.32 0.70 0.29 0.13
(0.09) (0.13) (0.50)
Germany 0.79 -0.04 0.63 0.45 0.09
(0.88) (0.01) (0.64)
Greece 1.96 0.14 1.31 -0.12 -0.23
(0.49) (0.54) (0.64)
Iceland 2.8 0.39 2.01 -0.22 -0.03
(0.03) (0.0) (0.89)
Ireland 1.4 -0.54 1.73 0.05 -0.06
(0.01) (0.87) (0.75)
Italy 0.8 -0.31 1.11 -0.07 0.23
(0.10) (0.72) (0.25)
Netherlands 1.07 -0.35 0.76 0.11 -0.01
(0.10) (0.63) (0.97)
New Zealand 1.86 -0.09 1.62 0.01 0.53
(0.65) (0.95) (0.01)
Norway 3.17 0.04 3.4 -0.05 -0.44
(0.82) (0.81) (0.02)
Spain 1.06 0.30 1.59 0.09 0.34
(0.13) (0.63) (0.08)
Sweden 1.48 0.07 1.49 -0.12 0.21
(0.70) (0.56) (0.30)
UK 0.99 -0.31 1.19 -0.02 0.25
(0.10) (0.83) (0.18)
US 0.69 -0.36 1.00 0.50 -0.42
(0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
Mean 1.34 -0.19 1.38 0.10 0.07
Note: P-values are shown in parenthesis.  and  denote standard deviation and correlation,
respectively. Interest rates are the annual average of short-term interest rates on local denominated
T-bills over the period taken for labor share. See the data appendix for details.
37Table 3: Adjustments for Self-employment
Lab. Share Adj-1 Adj-2
(s) (s,y) (s) (s,y) (s) (s,y)
Argentina 5.02 0.56 5.60 0.54
(0.03) (0.04)
Brazil 2.38 0.03 2.88 0.20
(0.92) (0.43)
Chile 2.36 -0.12 2.18 -0.44
(0.54) (0.13)
Colombia 1.22 -0.06 1.15 -0.10
(0.88) (0.67)
Costa Rica 2.92 -0.22 2.59 -0.46
(0.26) (0.03)
Czech Republic 1.37 0.27 1.42 0.17
(0.30) (0.33)
Egypt 1.29 0.18 1.35 0.18
(0.58) (0.59)
Hungary 1.14 0.12 1.51 -0.02
(0.67) (0.95)
Korea 1.36 0.44 1.45 0.32
(0.02) (0.05)
Mexico 3.72 0.60 3.34 0.58
(0.0) (0.0)
Turkey 6.40 0.25 6.22 0.15
(0.30) (0.62)
Mean 2.65 0.18
Mean (Adj.) 2.46 0.10
Note: Adj-1 calculates labor share as the ratio of labor compensation of incorporate sector over
value added excluding unincorporate sector. Adj-2 assumes that labor income per self-employed
is equal to compensation of average worker and recalculates labor share as the multiplication of
compensation per employees and total employment. Adj-3 assumes that labor income of self-
employed is half of average compensation per worker and does the calculation as in adj-2.
Table 4: Cyclical Variation in Self-Employment and Total Employment
Brazil Korea Mexico Turkey
(se;y) 0.23 -0.28 0.30 -0.29
(l;y) 0.50 0.78 0.75 0.35
Note: (x;y) is the correlation between two variables. se denotes self-employment whereas l




Discount factor  0.98 0.99
Utility curvature  5 5
Labor curvature  2.75 2.0
Labor weight  varies varies
Capital exponent  0.43 0.40
Depreciation rate  0.02 0.02
Wage bill paid in advance  1 or 0.66
Bond holding cost  0.001 0.001
Capital adjustment cost  varies varies
Induced leverage  1.5 0.75
Net Foreign Debt = GDP   -0.42 -0.25
Shock process:
Mexico







b Rt = 0:05 b At 1 + 0:60b Rt 1 + r
t
Canada







b Rt = 0:12 b At 1 + 0:70b Rt 1 + r
t
39Table 6: Model Implications for Mexico
=1 =0.66
Data RBC Perfect Imperfect Perfect Imperfect
Credit Credit Credit Credit
Standard Deviation
Output 2.19 2.10 2.35 2.47 2.26 2.42
Labor share 3.58 0.0 2.01 3.06 1.34 2.43
Interest Rate 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01
Net exports 2.25 0.81 2.27 2.25 2.26 2.21
Standard Deviation
(Relative)
Wage 1.82 0.63 0.99 1.26 0.85 1.14
Hours 0.64 0.37 0.56 0.72 0.49 0.65
Consumption 1.35 0.58 0.67 1.05 0.62 1.25
Investment 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45 3.45
Correlation
with Output
Labor Share 0.44 0.0 0.41 0.66 0.40 0.66
Interest Rate -0.45 -0.36 -0.51 -0.57 -0.47 -0.52
Wage 0.41 1.0 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.92
Hours 0.64 1.0 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.92
Consumption 0.89 0.79 0.82 0.90 0.83 0.89
Investment 0.94 0.31 0.35 0.87 0.33 0.85
Net Exports -0.65 0.39 0.32 -0.47 0.36 -0.51
Lab. Share and R -0.48 0.0 -1.0 -0.96 -1.0 -0.93
Note: Data period is 1987Q1-2008Q1. All variables are in logs (except net interest rate and net export)
and HP-ltered. Quarterly labor share and wages are coming from manufacturing but labor shares in
manufacturing has a very strong correlation with labor share in overall activity at annual level. Investment
adjustment cost parameter is set to match investment volatility. Net export is dened exports minus
imports over output. The last line represents the correlation between labor share and interest rates.
40Table 7: Model Implications for Mexico and Canada: What dominates Where?
Mexico Canada
Data Baseline Sluggish Data Baseline Sluggish
Labor Labor
Standard Deviation
Output 2.19 2.43 2.28 1.30 1.02 0.92
Labor share 3.58 2.35 1.67 1.05 0.19 0.31
Interest Rate 2.01 2.01 2.01 0.40 0.40 0.40
Net Exports 2.25 2.25 2.25 0.88 0.21 0.27
Standard Deviation
(Relative)
Wage 1.82 1.10 1.01 0.64 0.49 0.40
Hours 0.64 0.65 0.55 0.65 0.49 0.40
Consumption 1.35 1.30 1.22 0.72 0.44 0.37
Investment 3.45 3.45 3.45 2.55 2.55 2.55
Correlation
with Output
Labor Share 0.42 0.66 0.53 -0.62 -0.19 -0.73
Interest Rate -0.45 -0.52 -0.49 0.33 0.25 0.25
Wage 0.41 0.92 0.92 -0.20 0.99 0.95
Hours 0.64 0.92 0.92 0.81 0.99 0.95
Consumption 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.69 0.99 0.95
Investment 0.94 0.84 0.72 0.72 0.96 0.95
Net Exports -0.65 -0.50 -0.30 0.07 0.55 0.68
Labor Share and R -0.48 -0.93 -0.89 -0.15 -0.94 -0.12
Note: Baseline model is the one with imperfect credit and  = 0:66. Third and sixth columns add adjustment
cost on labor to baseline model. For other details see table-6.
41